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THEl A F R I m  BROEDERBOND 1927-1948: 
CLASS VANGUARD OF A3RIKAN.R NATIONALISM* 
by 
Dan 0 lMeara 
We repeat the view we expressed a year ago - namely 
that the Broederbond is an arrogant, self-chosen elite, 
operating by stealth and intrigue, its early cultural 
aspirations swamped by its neo-Fascist ideas on race 
and colour. It is a cancerous growth in the living body 
of South Africa and as such its influence is deadly. (1) 
The Bond is a service organisation intended to serve the 
ATrikaner. Its sphere of operations is the work of the 
Afrikaner people as a separate historical, Protestant- 
Christian,language and cultural comity. The 
activities with which the Bond occupied itself from time 
to time are determined by the needs of the Afrikaner 
people at that historical moment. (2) 
A secret society with the professed aim of the "promotion of all the 
interests of the Afrikaner nation" ( 3 ) ,  the Afrikaner Broederbond (hereafter the AI3 
or ~ond) has long been the bogeyman of South African politics. Its operations are 
attacked as detailed and lurid conspiracies, and defended as the innocent, if 
confidential actions of public-spirited men. In the process, though much 
authoritative data on the Bond exists, its nature, functions and role have been 
thoroughly mystified. At the outset it must be stated that the AB has exerted a 
profound influence at all levels of South African politics. This paper attempts the 
beginnings of a demystification of the Bondls operations and an assessment of its role 
up till 1948. Given its secret nature, this is necessarily sketchy and schematic. 
Yet such an assessment requires more than an examination of conflicting claims about 
the Bxmederbond; it demands situating the Bond within the broader context of 
Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa. 
*l am gratefyl tq Professor T. Dunbar Moodie of the University of the Witwatersrand 
for generous access to his research material. IQ understanding of the organizatfon 
has benefited from discussions with both Professor Moodie and John Davies of Wiaconnin 
University, whose research on Christian National Education involves a clone kno.wlodgo 
-of -&e Wederbond. Neither bears any responsibility for possible erroru of fact in 
this paper and both disagree with my interpretation. 
As a political, social and ideological phenomenon, Afrikaner mtionalism 
has itself besn pemistently mystified by both its academic proponents and opponents. 
One group has soq&b to create politica3/cultural lgythology (4), the other - ogres. ( 5 )  
I%my non-Afrikaner historians have failed to read, or at least take seriously, what 
Afrikaners mite about themselves - how Afrikaner ideologues and, comentators have 
sought to interpret the world for the a - relying instead on the hackneyed 
interpretatiom of the political opponents of Afrikaner nationalism. (6) Ironically, 
this has produced a mirror image of its ideological assumptions. Almost without l 
exception, studies of Afrikaner nationalism have accepted the social categories 1 
inherent in the ideology: they have failed to query the ideological premise that 
ethnic/racial/cultural categories constitute the natural and sole units of social 
action in South Afpica, where social classes "are not meaningful social realitiesf1.(7) 
i 
Explanation remains rooted in ideas and ideology, themselves aspects of social action 
but hardly its explanation. By taking as given presisely that which reqwdms 
explanation - the primacy of ethnic/racial/cd.tmal categories - Afrikaner nationalism 
is presented aa a monolithic political, social and ideological phenomenon, Ewld is 
explained in a highly circular fashion either as the product of culture itself or as 
the oollective psychology of a culturally pm-defined group, "Afrikanerdomfl. I know 
of no attempt to explore Che generation, development and acquisition of the cultural 
values of Afrikaner nationalism, nor the interaction in the process of idsecreation 
between leaders and masses. These critical questions cannot merely be taken as given 
or self-explanatory. (8) This is no mere carping. If these questions are explored, 
Afrikaner nationalism soon ceases to be a monolithic response by an undifferentiated 
flAfxikanerdoratf, but emerges as the often surprisingly flexible reaction 62 specific 
class forces to the pressures of capitalist development. Throw the location of l l 
Afrikaans-speakers in the material world of the South African social fomation h all. 
its historical phases of development, different patterns of relation to the means of l 
production are immedia%ely apparent. The exploration of their effects illuminates 
the gradual development, and careful cultivation by specific gmups, af an ideological 
and political matrix which could apparently articulate and co-ordinate their varying 
responses to the pressures of capitalist development. 
It is suggested, then, that only through an infuaion of the categories of 
social class and the notion of class struggle can Afrikaner nationalism be demystified 
and the acquisition and operation of ideologies fully grasped. (9) 1% is in this 
context that a study of the AB as a class organization is critical, not only in the de- 
conspiratorialization of the Bond itself but, given its 1ead.i~ role, as a demystification 
of Afrikanar nationalism as well. It will be argued that during the period under review 
the AB was a purely petty bourgeois organization, rooted in the northern provinces of 
the Transvaal and Or- Free State, and concerned with the parkicular effects of the 
trajectory of capitalist development on the Afrikaans-speaking fraction of the pet* 
bourgeoisie. Once these were eased thro.llgh the mobilization of support from other 
Afrikaans-speaking class forces a.nd the use of State power, the natum of the AB changed. 
Itself wracked with conflict between these competing class forces, it lost its vanguard 
position, (10) 
The Bond grew out of a grouping calling itself Jow Suid Afrika (young South 
~frica), fomed early in 1918. In June of tht year it changed its name to the 
Afrikaner Broederbond (literally, the Afrikaner  roth her hood). It was a time of 
political crisis and depression - lfAfrikaszerdom was bumihq in hellfire". The 1913 
split in the South African Party produced confusion and bitterness among Afrikaners, 
particularly in the northern provinces. This was compounded by the violent suppression 
of the Rebellie, the execution of Joupie Fourie and the imprisonment of its leaders by 
the Botha government. Ag~iculture was depressed, the influenza epidemic raged, and the 
squeeze on land and effects of the Bebellie drove increasing numbera of rural whites 
into the cities, compounding the problem of "poor whiteism". All writings on the Bond 
stress the ~ignificance of this period, when "politically and economically the Afrikaner 
M been reduced to a slave in the land of his birth". (11) These conditions 
generated or@-uiized responses. In the Free State, General Hertzog had formed 
the Nationalist Par-by, followed by the formation of similar parties in the 2'msvaal 
and the Cape. The Helprnekaar (Mutual  id) organization was conceived to pay the fines 
of the imprisoned leaders of the Rebellie, and its mobilization of the saving8 of 
Afrikaans-speakers was partly to inspire the formation of the two future insumce 
gimts, Santa and Sdam. The growth of the co-operative movemeat similarly dates 
from this period. In the Cape, the cultural nationalism of the lrwguage movement was 
given political and economic muscle. In three full years a hanW of Cape T o m  and 
Stellenbosch professf o m l  men fome (Nationd. press), the Cape 
Nationalist Party, a d  Santa and S Western Cspe was little 
affected by the economic and political crises which wracked the northern provinces. 
The well-off, educated Afrikaners who formed these groups were in a very different 
position from those in the north. The bitter words of a contemporary verkrampte 
sumrey of the foxmation of the AB echo the recurring conflict between the wealthier 
south and. the north in nationalist politics: ttcompared with, the acute dis.t;reas ara@&ng 
in the Northern Province, there was little need south of the Hex River." (13) 
!Ibis important point highlights what were, in effect, the different class 
bases of the nationalist movement in the Cape, on the one hand, and the Transvaal and 
the Free State, on the other - the effects of which persist in the Nationalist Party 
today. These variations relate in the main to the differential nature of the "rursl 
community" which formed the backbone of nationalist support - the nature of fmixig 
operations, their relationship with the colonial state in the emergence of ccmercial 
agriculture, the size and location of markets, etc.; to the position of the petty 
bourgeoisie vis-Lvis capital in general and. the colonial state in particular; and 
fo the relationship between the Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie and these 
differentiated rural groups. Compounded by differing colonial experiences and the 
widely divergent economic and political effects of the -10-Boer war on the 
Afxikaans-speaking population8 of the north and south, these differences p~duced c?m 
economically, politically and culturally divided q"8frikanerdom11 at union in 1910. 
The federation of the various provincial parties in the uneasy alliance of the South 
African Party fostered an illusion of unity which was shattered in 1913 on the issue 
of %he relationship with imperialism. The Afrikaner Broederbond was born into, and 
self-consciously as a result of, these divisions. It was always an urban, petty 
bourgeois, northern-dominated grouping, reflecting in itself too the differential. 
relationship with fractions of capital between the northern and southern petty 
bourgeoisie. Given the key interpretative role of this class in all the provinces, 
some of these differences must be examined briefly in an attempt to explain why the 
petty bourgeois response should have been specifically Afrikaner nationalist and why 
there were important variations in content and orientation between the provincial 
movements. 
The answers to these questions lie in the nature of the economic and 
political incorporation of the Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie in the broad 
South African social formation. Within the imperialist colonial states a clear 
cultural oppression operated against Afrikaans speakers. Long before the war ended 
the independence of the Republics, so generating of fierce cultural response, the 
1- movement of the Cape had inspired a strong cultural nationalism. (14) More 
importantly, in an essentially peripheral econoqy dominated by the ideology of 
imperialist interest, for those Afrikaners unprepared to accept cultural assimilation 
and who possessed a modicum of training rendering them unsuitable for manual labour, 
employment opportunities were limited. Law, the Church, education and the lower 
levels of the state bureaucracy were the only real avenues available. (15) English 
was the l a n g ~ ~ & ~  of the economy. Even within these occupations, opportunities for 
advancement were limited and Afrikaam speakers discriminated against. Thwr, for the 
Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, economic opportunities were limited, both by class 
position and language. Yet these occupations placed the petty bourgeois individua3, in 
a unique position from which to experience and at the same time to mediate -the effects 
of imperialism for virtually all Afrikaans speakers. He interpretated its law for 
farmers and workers, taught its curriculum to their children, implemented its policies 
and, as a cleric, was particularly responsible for the interpretation of the entire 
experience - Its explanation in cosmio and symbolic terms - to a c o n f w e d m .  Thus, 
in a sense, the experience of bperialism was synthesized in the Afrikaner petty 
bourgeoisie. R'3r did the structure of South Africm capitalism in its imperialist 
phase provi.de the cultwally aware Afrikaner fraction of the petty bourgeoisie with 
any real potential allies within the dominant capitalist class, except perhaps in the 
Cape. Such alliances would involve total cultural asslmila.tion and, more important. 
an acceptance of the long-term dominance of the interests of imperialist mining arid 
finance capital.. Many Afrikaners did make such alliances. Given the nature of the 
emergence of comercial apiculture after the Anglo-Boer war, specific fractions of 
agricultural capital, particularly in the eastern and. western Transvaal, increasiqly 
identified their interests with imperialism after the 1913 Land Act. Bo4ha and Smuts 
personified this alliance. But the petty bourgeoisie did not have this independent 
basicl on which to act. By nature a dependent class, alliances had to be sought 
elsewhere. 
In the Cape, conditions were less traumatic, and the potential alliance 
clear. The long established and prosperous commercial agriculture of the wedtern Cape 
and Boland provided iz viable basis for political and economic alliance - ~ u ~ d  the 
possibilities of independent accmulation. Drawing on the tradition and expeslence oj. 
the Afrikaner Bond, the formation of the Cape Nationalist Parw, Die Nasiomle Pers, 
and Santaa and Sanlam, had been seen very clearly in these terns. In June 1;15 i:- 
De A m ,  a llNationalist Party" was established by General Kertzogts leading Cape 
Parliamentaxy supporter, the Ehglish-speaking Professor H. E. S. 3'remant1ee The 
Fremantle Party was based amongat -the poorer fanners of the northern Cape, and sn" ,.r, 
Hertzogts blessing, "a development which Advocate Hennie Van Zyl, W. A. B a f i e ! ~  aYrd 
their friends were not prepared to toleratet1. (16) Mobilizin$ support from western 
Cape and Boland fanners, a group of Cape Town and Stellenbosch professional men f c m G  
their own Nationalist Party in the same month, and, after Hofmeyx had refused the 
proferred leadership, invited Dr M a n  to leave his pulpit, lead the Pax* and adit 
its recently established mouthpiece, Die Burger. In September, the alliansc;. of Cape 
Town petty bourgeoisie and wealthy farmers took over the Fremantle Party, made the 
Professor their Vice-Chairman, arad assigned him to political oblivion. In terns of 
their vision, the Cape Party, Die Nasionale Pers and Santam and Sanlam were to be 
financed by the rural bourgeoisie, run by the urban petty bourgeoisie, and pow thro7:gh 
the mobilization of the full spectrum of m a l  support. This strategy ultimateby 
provided an independent basis of accumulation, producing a financia.1 capital in the 
south which dominates the Afriktwner nationalism of the Cape. 
In the north, and the (Prcwsvaal particularly, no such potentially viable 
economic alliances were available. The petty bowt?@poisie was politically more isola-ted 
and required to interpret an economically much more hostile world for the great bulk c ~ f  
Afrikaam speakers who had never known the prosperity of the Cape. The political. 
struggle of the noxthern petty bourgeoisie was thus built on an alliance not with a 
strong fraction of capita1,as in the Caye, but with poorer farmers and (potentially - 
it took a long time to develop) a class fraction which grew out of this group, 
Afrikaner workers. This could only be anti-imperialist in tone. Yet the pre-1934 
ideological content of Afrikaner nationalism in the north was dominated by rural 
interests - the problems of "poor whiteismtl seen in rural terms, requiring a xetwcn to 
the land. It is precisely this ideologically isolated position, reflecting %he total 
economic dependenoe of the northern petty bourgeoisie, which made the Broederboncl so 
vital. From the outset it expressed its concern with urban issues. It saw the 
problems of poor whiteism and the position of Afrikaners generally as an urban rather 
then rural phenomenon. Its solutions were never to be sought simply at the level of 
politics, but in the ownership structure of the indwtrial economy, by challenging the 
nature of South African capitalism itself. This orientation gave it the vanguard role 
after 1927, and, even in the d.qy~1 of the Hertzog Party, differentiated it from the 
broader concerns of the nationalist establishment. 
Thus the politics of the "Afrikanerd~rn~~ into which the infant AB was born in 
1918 reflected the class cleavages between Afrikaans speakers. In this bitter climate, 
fourteen railwaymen, theologians and policemen formed "an organisation in which 
Afrikanera could find each other in the midst of great colafusion and disunity m d  be 
able to work together for the aurvival of the Afrikaner people in South Africa and 
the promotion of its interests". (17) According to its -then secmtaqy, l.? 4 %  earLy 
years "it was l i t t l e  more than a semi-religious or@sationtt, with little pyqowe cr 
direction. (18) In December 1919 s loyalty oath was introduced and. the fr?.l-l-2~!-~g year 
a coa?si;itution firmlly adapted. (19) Real eqansion began in 1921. In of that 
year, it took up the question of Afrikws schools (20), an interest which att~,cfed 
"a large number of teacherstt. They infused a new life into the Bond, one ~ollrce 
claimring for it a membership of 2,000 in 1924. (21) The Oelofse Beport dates its 
expansion fman Auguat 1921 with the formation of a new branch in Krugersdorp. On the 
26th of that month s majority of the meeting held in the Carlton Note1 decided the 
Bond would become a secret organhation. Henceforth it began to concern ihelf with 
policy issues, dealirig with matters s u ~ h  as "the sxative question, immigration, 
profiteering, home language education and library affairs". (22) Kowever, disserision 
crept in over the ~ationalist/~abour Party Pact. The Bond! S effectiveness was 
undewned by an acrimonious split 19255, and there a m  suggestions of a "purge", 
though this m a ~  refer to 1927. After reconciliation in.1925, another period of 
"consolidation anti expansion" commenced, culrmlnating in the critical 1927 deci~ian ''to 
take an active part in the life of the community, leaving no avenue neglectedtt, (23 j  
From this moment, the AB began to assume for itself a vangu~rd role within A+kYdh e r  
nationalism and extend its parameters beyond the loose fedesation of Provincial 
N~tionalist Parties. 
Designed to ensure secrecy and control, the or&zational stmc-tum of the 
AB has changed little since the 1920s. The basic organizational unit is the division 
of between five and fifty members, meetingmonthly. The or@za-i;ionas hig%best 
authority is the Bondsraad, a congress of divisional delegates convened at the 
beginning of each July. A twelve-member Uitvoemde Raad (UR - executive council!, 
obistened !'the twelve apostlesw, presided over daily affairs, Menbership is 
restricted to financidly sound, white, Afrikaans-speaking, Protestaat mles, oTrer 
age 25, of "unimpeachable characterv', who actively accept South Africa as t:-a+r 93113 
homeland, containing a separate A f r h e r  nation with its own language and c~d.-ture. 
To this long list of restrictions is added a complicated and careful selecticx ?r3cemY 
Membership is by invitation only - nobody can apply to join the Bond. Rmes of: 
prospective members, who must be known to at least half the members of the division, 
are circulated among the divisions and the UR. A system of blackballing llmeintain~ 
quality". It is this very tight selection process - the old-boy network to end them 
all - which produces charges of elitism and, according to one f o m r  member, "enormous 
resentment amongst ordinary Afrikanerstl. Appmved candidates become members of the 
division nearest their homes. Exceptions are the "W or ' tt 
(exempted brothers), who, "because of circumstances outside his control", cavlnot dew? .- 
the requisite time to divisional meetings. In practice, Los bmers are menabem in hi@- 
public office whose contribution is in terns of direct influence rather than activity.<;$) 
Zn the thirties and forties, the Afrikaans urban population was overwhelmingly 
working class. Divisional membership is constitutionally required to reflect the 
occupational spectrum of the local Afrikaner c o d t y ,  giving the Bond the "ri&tl' to 
speak in its name. In practice, membership was, and. is, confined largely to the 
professions. A stiff annual fee (£12.10.0.) and a system of regular financial levies, 
together with the strict requirement that prospective members be financially sound, 
ruled out workirg class membership in any but token numbers. Workers were never 
involved in the organization. It was felt that "there was no specific need for workers 
5n the Broederbondtv. (25) Analysis of membership throughout its 57-year history 
hi&li&ts both its petty bourgeois nature and the subtle ~ihifts in dominance by 
various groups. Teachers, academics, clergymen and civil semraslts have always provided 
the backbone of the Bond - over 50 per cent of its 2,528 members in 1944, and still 35 
per cent of 9,413 members in 1972, Other perennially large occupatioml groupings are 
farmers, politicians, lawyers, jowcnalists and assorted "businessmenn. In the thirties, 
the early influence of teachers was overshadowed by the ideological dominance of 
academics, pasticularly those of Potchefstroom University. Reflecting the ARls CO~CPT 
with economic issues, the forties saw a strong influx of businessmen. !Their 
proportional membership rose f m m  virtually nil. in the thirties to 15 per cent by 1972, 
with a dispmportionate influence within the Bond, From the forties to roughly the 
sixties, no one group equalled the ideological dominance of the academics during the 
thirties. (26) 
Built on "a Christian-national foundation", wiLh its motto "Be strongif, the 
Bondgs const3.tulioml aims are three-fold: "to effect an healthy and prop~ressivc 
unity between all Afrikaners who strive for the welfare of the Afrikaner nation; the 
stimulation of Afrikaner national consciousness and the inculcation of love for its 
lang;uage, religion, tradition, country and people; and the promotion of all the 
interests of the Afrikaner nation." Clause 6 of the constitution excludes party 
politics from the organization, containing a seven-fold guide to individual political 
. action. This includes full constitutional sovereignty; combatting all inferior 
treatment of Afrikaners and Afrikaans in the civil service; ending the foreign 
exploitation of South Africafs population and resources through nationally controlled 
intensive industrialization; segregation of all "non-whites" under white 
" ~ ~ ~ ~ n s h i p " " ; h a b i l i t a t i o n  of the rural areas and full 11civilized7f white 
employment; "nationalisation" of finance and the planned co-ordination of the ecox~omy; 
a d  the Christim-national "Afrikaneri~ation~~ of public life and education with 
freedom for self- development for all groups, "provided it does ndt constitute a X 
to tha state". (27) !These aim clearly cover a broad spectrum of interest. lk o::itical 
question is what exactly constitutes "the Afrikaner nation" and its ltin%smsts". \p?o 
are the '!=It (US) of nationalist rhetoric? What was it about "S" which ennlt13d the 
interests of farmers, workers, peasants, pet-by bourgeoisie and. capitalists to be 
depicted as those of "the Afrikaner nation", and how have these interests changed? 
After 1927 the Broederbond entmxsted itself with the largely successful identification, 
interpretation, guardianship and promotion of 'these interests. Its analysis and 
solutions to the problems of llAfrikanerdomll were those of an economically deprived a 3 
excluded petty bourgeoisie. The structure of South African capitalism. was ide,zlifSt.f 
as the source of this discrimination and the Bond set out "to capture the f o r e i g ;  
[capitalist] system and transfom and adapt it to our national characterff. (28) l%e 
Afrikaner nationalism it espoused was similarly a petty bourgeois response which could 
co-ordinate the interests of various Afrikaans-speaking class forces against the 
"imperialistw hegemonic and dominant classes. 
Beyond these broad aims, how does the Broederbond function? It must be 
clearly understood that for most of its life the AB was a poliay-making, co-ordinating 
body. It deterruined the fields of action and their parameters for the volk, withrut 
itself directly implementing policy. Its own description of the process of policy 
formation is illuminating. Nonthly divisional meetings consider "everything to do with 
Afrikaners in its particular area, especially economic life". Policy proposals a m  
first discussed within a division, presumed to be representative of the local cornunit?. 
Individual members llexercise their professional expertise~~ on the problem. Proposal3 
are then referred to other divisions and examined "with due regard for local conditions 
and requirements". If widely supported, a flmore searching enquiry is instituted" by UR- 
appointed "experts". When the "fully worked-out" scheme is accepted by the Bondsma-G, 
"it follows it must have been fully discussedf1. If its realization "is not dependent cl; 
state action", the scheme Itis laid before the people" for ratification, not by the BOJ->~, 
(it has no public existence), "but by those people who have the greatest interest in it", 
In practice, this meant convening a V o l k s k o ~ s  national congress) by one o f  
the AB's front organizations. These occurred regularly during the thirties a.nd forties 
when it was mobilizing support for its policies. Finally, "if state action is essential 
for the implementation of the scheme, the matter is submitted to the gavernment body 
concerned for consideration and the necessary steps, or to the nation for consideration 
in public. Should the project meet with approval, it is then taken *her b;y the 
proper authorities". (29) Since all South Africats prime ministers after 1948 and mosC 
of their cabinets have belonged to the Bond, it generally has little problem in gaining 
the e m  of "the proper authoritiesff. Recalling his 20-year membership, one now 
antagonistic former divisional chairman insisted the process was "extremely democratic". 
Complaints were "thorou&ly and frankly airedl',and through this"democratic proceduelf 
the Bond generated "a very powerful sense of fellowship, solidarity and codb e n t  - if 
one can use the phrase of the Bmederbond, a feeling of intense c~mdeship'~. As the 
old-boy network par excellence, it established "ongoing machinery to handle every-thing", 
When entering a new field, e.g. trade unionism in 1936, "it always establishes a public 
frontn. (30) Since 1929, its major policy implementing body has been the Federasie vr~ii 
Af rikaanse Kultuurverenigings (~ederation of Af rikaans Cul tuxal ~ s s o c i a t i o r ~ E - - '  
described by military intelligence as the AB's "pasteboard stalking horse". (31) 
A picture esderges of a n  lslmense f o m l  and informal network of I.nfl-aence at; 
all social levels. Pur m h  of its existence the AB dominated the institutional, 
ideological and financial life of Afrikaner nationalism. Its influence r-s throq$ 
cultural organization, the Afrikaam churches, the Nationalist Party, professional 
groupings and. the spectrum of Afrikaans business undertakings to all levels of state 
power itself - from the State President throu& the state brnaucracy, civil and 
military. A military intelligence chart of its influence dming the war suggested tknt, 
beyond its formal and informal connections, a system of Waaksaamheid (vigilance) 
cormnittees functioned to keep an eye on and foster 'Wrikanex interests" in all fields. 
This was repeate(91y denied. However, 1973 the published detailed lists of 
the members of these committees, staffed by the Bondss intellectual elite and deputed 
Itto keep a close watch on every public body and eveq important sector of public life -... 
notice any backsliding, lack of enthusiasm or deviation from policy". (32) It is nsl 
overstatement to suggest, however, that the Bond "runs" South Africa - is its secret 
guvernment. This devalues the role of the Party itself, which is no simple AB front in 
politics, and has often been in conflict with it, But certainly its influence kzts been 
profound, its "advices' a1wa;ys listened to, and, when unanimous, regularly foilowed. 
Its decisive interventions at all poliq levels apart, the Bond has furthered 
its membersqnteerets in other wws, While its various public utterances and apologists 
depict a dedicated, selfless band. of public-spirited men working unrewarded in the 
service of their-, much evidence suggests the material compensations of membereh+v - 
beyond mere influence. The Botha Commission reproduces an AB document labelled 
H0lpmekaa;r (help each other), listing numerous occupational vacancies in ten % o w ~  .. 
naming the Broers to be contacted. Curiously, it then dismissed the claim lobat the AB 
fosters "jobs for pals". Military intelligence reports and the lonerunning &+g- T i ~ ~ s  
campaign against the Bond cite similar documents. Moodie quotes "8 former ckirmarr" of 
the AB saying it has now degenerated into 'l jobs for pals". (33) At the least, this old- 
boy network has protected its members! interests very effectively. It is wi&eJy acce~tud 
among& Afrikaners that membership is extremely useful careerwise, and ahost as rri.del;r 
resented by nationalist non-members. (34) Be this as it may, through its ne%work of 
influence, for much of the period under review, the Bond controlled two key areas of 
Afrikaner nationalism - ideology and finance: 
The AB's tremendous influence must be attributed to the fact 
that its policy is based on two funhnental principles, 
namely to gain control of the minds of Afrikanerdom through 
control of its educational institutions and to control its 
actions by gaining a tight grip on its purse strings. (35) 
For much of the twenties the AB functioned in smi-%sonic fashion, almost 
exclusively in cultural fields. Two traumatic events in the twenties aYld thirties 
decisively altered its role and led to the adoption of a vmgmad position. !The fixst 
was the 1926 Balfour Declaration on the sovereignty of the Dominions. Returning from 
the Irnperial conference, the nationalist Prime Minister, General Hertzog, announced the 
constitutional aims of the his Party were now largely satisfied and it would abandon 
its republican demands. The horrified republicans grouped themselves round men 
like Dr N. J. van der Merwe, who established a formal republican ginger group 
~epublikeinsebond) within the party in 1930, after consultation with the Potchefstmom 
Lcademics who then dominated the AB. (36) Certainly it would appear that the formaticn 
of an AB clique within the Transvaal party was inspired by Hertzogfs declaration and the 
decision that he was no longer to be fully trusted. Thereafter, the AB became in a 
sense an alternative to the Party itself, attracting men like those of Potchefstxoon. 
Though this could only be proved with access to AB archives, I would argue Hertzog's 
announcement prompted the 1927 decision to "expand activities and take an active part 
in the life of the community, leaving no avenue neglected". (37) Its self-conscious 
&ssumption of the v-d mantle of Afrikaner nationalism certainly dates from this 
period. 
The prime achievement of the Bond in the late twenties was its estabxishment 
of a cultural front in December 1929 - the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurveregi~-, 
(FAK). Established to "combat cultural chaos", the FAK was the Bond" answer to the 
"need for central coordination" of cultural action, thr?ough which it controlled and 
politicized the cultural debates of the thirties. 
"l% [the formation of the FAK] had only one great 
meaning. Afrikaners should Gasp each other by the 
hand; the F.A.K. should bring the hands together; 
and those hands should never let each other go. If (38) 
The Bond always insisted it merely "inspired" the FAPs f~rmation~whereafter the 
orga,nization developed its own dynamic. The F !  did embark on a wide range of 
activitieu. By 1937 almost 300 cul.twm.1 bodies, church councils, youth and student 
associations, charitable, scientific and educational groups had affiliated to it. 
Yet it was without doubt the AB's front - paternitjr was often acknowledged. With few 
token exceptions both shared the same executive councils and officials, who publicly 
implemented privately determined policy. In effect, the AB's routine cultural work 
was now openly undertaken by the F M ,  freeing the Bond to concentrate on policy. 
"We find the A.B. is slowly handing over the cultural 
work itself to our much bigger son, the F.A.K. ... 
[but] national culture and the welfare of the slation 
will only flourish if the South African people break 
all foreign political bonds. After the cultural and 
economic needs, the A.B. will have to devote its 
attention to the political needs of our people." (39) 
Of the disenchanted petty bourgeois Republicans the Bond attracted in the late 
twenties, most important were the Gereformeerde academics of Potchefstroom. They 
brought to it a developed, rigorously conservative, Calvinist Weltanschauwa~; - the 
skeletal framework for an ideological redefinition of Afrikaner natiomlism which they 
heavily influenced in the thirties. These academics gave the AB a new vigour ayld self- 
consciously operated as its ideologues. In the confused days of Coalition and Fusion, 
their influence kept much of the Afrikaner intelligentsia out of the United Party and 
provided some ideological credibility to the very weak Gesuiwerde (purified) Eationalist 
Party in the northern provinces. (40) Between the formation of the FAK and Coalition 
in 1933, they set out to streng-then the Bond organizationally as well. The 
Republikeinsebond was one result, though other schemes, such as an approach to the 
"Royal Order of Scotlandf1 appear rather ludicrous. And the Bond moved slowly out of 
its Transvaal exclusivism. In 1931 the first OFS branch was established in 
Bloemfontein, followed shortly by another in Cape Town. (41) 
Whatever the Republicanst mistrust of I-Iertzog, given his immense political 
stature, they were unable to move out of the Nationalist Party into an open challenge 
until he himself precipitated the break. The Coalition crisis of 1933 and split in 
tPle Nationalist Party with Fusion in 1934 were the second of the catalysts which 
finally gave the AB ideological predominance in the north. Of the 74 Nationalist MFs 
elected in 1933, only 19 joined the Cape leader, Dr D. F. Malan, in refusing to follow 
Hertzog into fusion with Smutsf South African Party to fora the United Party (UP). 
Of these, l4 were Cape representatives. Only one of the Transvaal" 32 Nationalist Mgs 
anil four of 15 in the OFS remained aloof. The result was to shift the weight of 
Nationalist ideological and political leadership in the north towards extra-parliamentary 
sources. An extra-parliament= tradition developed to contribute to the vicious split 
between the parliamentary Nationalist Party and the various extraeparlimentary groups 
(particularly the Ossewa ~rmdwag) during the war. The Potchef S troom academics thus 
exercised an inordinate leadership, soon complemented by the slightly different emphases 
of returning students such as Drs Diedrichs, Meyer and Verwoerd. 
Fusion maxked two related developments in Afrikaner Nationalism. Firstly, it 
changed its class basirj - more particularly, the relationship between rural and petty 
bourgeois elements in the north. Under Hertzog, m 1  interests dominated the concerns 
of Afrikaner xlationalism. The petty bomgeoisie were relegated to a supportive 
position. Given the nature of its economic concerns, heavily dependent on the state and, 
discriminated against by ttimperialisml', the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie was left 
isolated in the north. Almost without exception, northern commercial agricult~m 
supported the UP. Rural support for the Gesuiwerdes, such as it was, came from poorer 
farmers or professional groups in the platteland towns. In its isolation, the petty 
bourgeoisie was reduced to articulating the interests of "the small man". This gave 
the brthem Ge~uiwerde pmty,and the Afrikaner nationalism which developed a very 
different class chmacter to its Hertzogite predecessor, an almost exclusively petty 
bourgeois grouping. (42) 
In the Cape, however, the petty bourgeoisie was still in political and 
economic alliance with commercial agriculture, and operating in a different political 
tradition. Fo~mteen Cape MPs remained in the Ggsuiwerde party, and more importantly, 
thanks largely to the efforts of W. A. Hofmeyr a;nd F. C. Erasmus, most of the branch 
oa~sations as well. Cape Nationalists thus enjoyed strong Parliamentary 
representation. Their leader, Dr Malan, was now national leader of the Gesuiwerdes, 
the only really prominent member of the Hertzog party to stay out of Fusion. His 
stature was thus even greater. The Cape Gesuiwerde party was in effect almost 
identical to its Hertaogite predecessor, personally, ideologically, and or~zationally. 
Unlike the north, neither a strong extra-Parliamentary tradition developed nor Pad the 
class basis of organized Cape Afrikaner nationalism changed much with fusion. This 
had important long4erm effects. The prestige of Dr Malan and the numerical 
predominance of Cape MPS gave the Cape Party and the interests it represented a 
national preponderance much resented in the north. Secondly, though Malan himself 
undoubtedly ch-d his position on many important issues (e.g. ~epublicanism) and 
made concessions to the developing mortnern rhetoric, the &directed ideological 
redefinition did not go nearly so far in the Cape - it did not need to. Operating in 
a different class ayld ideological nexus, the relatively few Cape AB activists were 
less wrapped in the ideological mysticism of the north. 
A second related result of fusion was the emergence of a new generation of 
ideological and political leaders, again predominantly in the north. These younger 
men had not fought in the -10-Boer war and had lived most of their lives in a 
unified South Africa. Given a chance at leadership and an influence they would 
otherwise have had to wait long for, they brought to Afrikaner nationalism new vigour, 
ideas and perspectives. To the influence of the young Potchefstroom academics was 
soon added that of men like the famous four doctors, N. Diedrichs, P. J. Meyer, 
H. F. Verwoerd, and A. Hertzog - all newly returned from overseas study, md,Diedrichs 
and Meyer in particular, heavily influenced by European Fascism. With the Potchefstroom 
academics they led the post-fusion ideological redefinition of Afrikaner nationalism. 
Soon after Coalition, a new jo.~unal, Koem (Directions), appeared from 
Potchefstroom. Its first editorial expounds its self-conscious ideological role: 
"Indeed, in our country and throughout the entire world, 
there exists the greatest confusion on religious, moral, 
educational, social, political and economic issues. 
However weak and impotent it may be in many respects, 
with the help and mercy of God, Koers will try to give 
direction in all these areas." (r 
During the thirties, Koers was effectively the theoretical journal of a major faction 
of the Bond. It raised all the contemporary issues, answering them in policy terms. 
The analysis of coalition in its first issue shows clearly the environment it so@t 
to interpret, and the economic motivation underlying AB nationalism: 
"General Hertzog has achieved what neither Gen. Botha 
nor Gen. Smuts could do. He has reconciled the great 
majority of Afrikaners with the idea of the British 
Empire.. . . When, with Sovereignty [reference to the 
1926 Balfour Declaration and 1931 Statute of ~es-tminster], 
Gen. Hertzog also accepted cooperative imperialism, in 
in practice the differences between the two large parties 
on this issue fell away.... It is therefore certain that 
under the new regime less enrphasis will be placed on 
sovereignty than on mutual cooperation within the Empire. 
"Once spin Imperialism will stride triumphant through 
the land. Under present international conditions, 
oooperative Imperialism will mainly, though not 
exclusively, take the form of economic collaboration. 
O u r  monetary system, our commercial and banking 
policy, our industrial sector will remain Imperialist 
oriented and g ~ o w  increasingly so. In the place of 
the old political subjugation we now enter a period of 
economic dependence. And the golden chaias so forged 
a m  much stronger and more dangerous than the old 
[political] chains because they are more difficult to 
reco&se, arnd once forged, are not easily discarded. 
The apparatus of this collaboration is already largely 
extant, particularly in the banking and commercial 
sectors. Only a government fully committed to South 
Africa's economic independence could escape this 
octopus grip. What will happen under a government 
sympathetic to imperialism] is impossible to predict. 
In this environment of perceived economic domination, the AB stmve to interpret the 
world and formulate counter-policy for its petty bourgeois membership. It recognized 
political power was the key to an inversion of this process. Yet the petty bousgeoisj~' 
was isolated. Allies had to be found. These consisted potentially of two major poupts - 
' the poorer fanners, and, secondly, dlfrikaans-speaking workers, who had been created :;.L 
,' many pxeosuxes on the former. But their support cou3d not simply be a-gpropxiated. Poox~;-:- 
fanners tended to follow the lead of wealthier land-owners , and Afxikaner wo~kers di~y'.~%:~,:l 
an unhealtAhy a+tra.cfion for class organizations. Given the existence of a large pous of 
poor whites, a real danger existed that they could be mobilized in class terns, thereby 
undermining any potential mass base for Afrikaner nationalism. An obsession with the 
daqers of class division and class mobilization is a major theme of mtionalist 
ideologues of this period. These p u p s  had to be saved for the and nobilized in 
cultural terms. Yet underlying all these problems was the almost complete exclusion 
of Afrikaa,ns-speakers from control in any sector of the economy bax famning. By 
1938/9 Afrikanercontrolled enterprises contributed just 8% to total turnover in 
commerce, 3% of industrial output, 1% of mining, and 5% of finance. (45) If the basis 
of imperialist domination was economic, as Koers argued, the mere capture of state 
power would not end it. That was the discredited Hertzog panacea, Rather, Afrikaners 
would have to move into positions of economic control. The petty bourgeoisie would 
have to transform itself into a bourgeoisie on the savings of Afrikaner workers and. 
fmers - the proven Cape formula. This, too, was the message of Koers. Thus, 
throughout the thirties, the AB directed its attention to these inter-related problems, 
operating in three broad areas: the ideological redefinition of Afrikanerdom m d  i t s  
nationalism - kultu~olitiek; the organization of Afrikaner workers into separate 
'trade unions; ruld the establishment and promotion of Afrikaner buainess interests. 
The pm- and post-fusion ideological definitions differed at two levels - 
the delimitation of "Afrikanerdom" and the nationalism which resulted. The Bertzag 
conceptions which thoroughly dominated the Nationalist Party,were obliquely concerned 
with class. & white South Africans, English- and Afrikaans-speaking, who subscribed 
to the Hertzog definitions were the constituents of ttAfrikanerdomn. Its thxee p a t  
ideals were sovereign independence; absolute equality of language ri&ts between 
English and Afrikaans; and limited economic nationalism - summed up in the "South 
Africa First" motto. (46) The 1925 Imqpqp and Flag Acts, the 1932 Status Act, and 
the achievements of the Pact government largely fulfilled these ideals, and, as Koers 
recognized, Hertzog could rejoin with Smuts. The ffAfrikanerdomff the Hertzog Party 
sought to mobilize was never seen purely in terms of a rigidly culturally defined=. 
So far as the Party concentrated on "cultural" issues, it was in the context of language 
rights. It implicitly accepted the class divisions within "whiteff South Africa as the 
basis of political action, was generally content to leave Afrikaans-speaking workers t a  
the Labour Pa*, and mde li%tle attempt to attack their mobilization and orDganiaation. 
in class terms. (47) 
This ideological lfloosenessv and acceptance of ftforeigawno-tions of class 
iLivision were held. responsible for Hertzogts "sell-out" to imperialism. If not %o be 
repeated, the concepts Afrikanerdom, Afrikaner nationalism, the question of class in 
poaitics and the nature of politics itself required extensive redefinition. English- 
speakers could be excluded as "foreign elementsu, involving a definition of what was 
peculiarly "Afrikw" about Afrikaners - an intensive analysis of kultuulr in Pta 
widest sense, interpreted in terms of the @tAfrikaner" past. The pameters of 
culture established, they had then to be translated into specifically politica,l 
ideology - given a content which could appeal to the interest of all ttAfrikaners". 
Thus the thirties saw an intense and wide-ranging debate amongst the AB intellectuals 
on kiltuu~, S, politics, economics, history, religion, etc., as %er sought to 
reinterpret the experience of imperialism and translate it into ideological forms. 
Within this debate, at least three major streams of influence, each wi-kh 
many permutations, can be identified. Through Koers and the individual writ* of 
men such as Professors J. C. Vgn Rooy (AB chairman7 L. J. du Plessis, B. G. Sxaker 
and C. Coetzee, the Potchefstroom academics elaborated a rigidly Calvinist 
WeBtanschauung, drawing heavily on the doctrine of 
(sovereignty in each sphere) of the Dutch theologi 
Through Koers they kept up a running commentary on every aspect of social life. 
Heavily influenced by National. Sociaiism, other newly returned academics outside 
Potchefstroom developed a more secular nationalism. Elaborated amongst others by men1 
such as Drs N. Diedrichs, P. J. Meyer and G. Cronje, it received its most explic5-: 
statement in Diedrichs' Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing, published in 1936. Tni& 
group, too, found a regular organ in Wapenskou, j o d  of the Afrikaam-FTasi~~rtj~le 
~tudentebond(~frikaans National Students t union). A modified form of the "mo- 
Fichteann view was propagated by Dr 'TTerwoerd as editor of Die Travaler after 1937 - 
m d  led to a laating split with the first chairma;n of his board, W. A. Iiofmeyr. A 
third, less CO-oMmted source of Influence was another gmup of Calvinist 
%heologian/politiciane, those of the NGK. Altogether more pragraatic in tone and the 
application of d o w ,  they exerted a profound political influence, predomimri;ly 
through the Naaionale Pers,newspapers and the hsuiwerde party itself. This $'liberal- 
nationalist" influence emanated from men such as Dr Malan himself, Dr J. D. (''T~z6asw) 
Kestell, and Rev. W. Nicol. (4.) 
Despite the m a n y  differences within and between these groups, sufficient 
common ground existed to enable the ideological debate to take place within w e e d  
parameters. FOU broad areas of agreement emerged: the relationship between cultme 
and nationalism; the dangers of class divisions; the need for the economic 
mobilization of Afrikaners; and Republicanism. All groups agreed nations are products 
of Divine Will, each with an allotted task, distinguished from each other by culture 
in its broadest sense. Culture is thus to be developed for itself. Hence the Bond's 
assertion: 
"The Afrikaner Broederbond is born out of the deep 
conviction that the Afrikaner nation has been 
planted in this country by the Band of God, 
destined to survive as a separate nation with its 
own calling. (49) 
During the thirties, this divinely created Afrikaner nation was politically di.vided, 
culturally disunited and wracked by severe class divisions. Afrikaner workers had 
little contact with the S, displayed scant interest in its culture, and behaved 
economically and politically in class terms. The huge "poor white problem" was the 
most glazing manifestation of this division. Rapid "denationalizationv of urban 
Afrikaners, particularly poor whites, disturbed all ideologues. They agreed on the 
major theme of the period, the overriding need for unity (volkseenheid) and more 
particularly the need to win workers to Afrikaner Nationalism. In the words of 
Dr Diedrichs: 
"If the worker Is drawn a w  from out nation, we may 
as well write Ichabod on the door of our temple." (50) 
I-Zankering after the l'uni.ty" of the Great Trek m d  the Republics, in terms of whose 
aythology all were f ~ m e r s  and united against external enemies, class divisions were 
seen as the product of q'foreign" capitalism. While Afrikaners had suffered under 
capitalism, the solution lay in improving their position in the industrial economy, 
to take control of South African capitalism itself and develop a volkskapitalisme. 
"And meanwhile the adjustment process to foreign 
capitalism] was destroying our _voLk by alienating 
from it its economic leaders throw denationalisation 
and rendering its producing masses useless to it 
through proletarianisation. But in the awakenix of 
self-consciousness the yo& has realised this too and 
the new economic national movement sets itself the 
goal of reversing this process: to prevent the Purther 
destnaction of the Afrikaner _volk in m attempt to 
adjust to a foreign capitalist system; but to mobilise 
the to capture this foreign system and transform 
and adapt it to our national character." (51) 
And, finally, this transformation of kultuur, classes and the econony was to be 
encapsulated in a Republic, freed from British political domination, "independentff of 
the golden chains Koers so regularly warned of. On this, too, there was wanhity - 
thou@ Malanfs conversion was belated, and,some would e w e ,  hesitant. The Bond's 
vision of Republican nirvana received its apotheosis in the controversial Draft 
Republican Constitution published "for discussionff in 1942. (52) 
This common ideological gmund incorporated a consensus on the role of the 
individual in national endeavour, and the relationship between golitical power a;ad the 
economic struggle. Entrepreneurship was seen as the highest form of creative activity, 
provided the entrepreneur gave "serviceff in return for the just reward of profit, 
Calvinism in this sense representing the purest form of the Protestant Ethic, capitalist 
ideology in its pre-monopoly form. This interplay between y& and diens (profit a:nd 
service - to the community) both in politics and economics, was the major concern of 
the early issues of the two "ec~nomic~~ journals, Inspan (official FAK organ - hence 
AB) and Volkshandel (organ of the Afrikaanse Randelsinstituut - Chambers of Commerce - 
another offspring of'the AB. Despite their initial and symbolic anti-capitalist rhetoric, 
both clearly represent an attempt fo create a capitalist ideology in keeping with 
Calvinist prescriptions. Here, too, the ideological vanguard role of the Bond is 
evident. !L"hrou& these journals it took upon itself no less .a task than "the 
economic re-education" of Afrikaans-speakers - the reformulation of attitudes to 
economic participation in an urban industrial economy. lnspan was directed towards 
the broad masses, reflecting the mobilizational role of the (literally 
Union for the Act of Rescue), whilst Volkshandel grappled with the problems of the 
entrepreneur himself. (53) Their early issues contain two major themes. Firstly, 
the relationship between individual effort and reward is constantly explored, invoking 
a schema with a correct place in the hierarchy for all, and echoing many of the themes 
of European and American puritanism. Workers must work in return for a fair wage. 
The common pod lies in common effort allowing those with ability to rise to their 
natural level. Secondly, the function of the state is examined at length. Though 
some differences between ideological streams are evident here, all agree the state 
exists to provide a "just" framework for the mediation of individual effort. This 
has many aspects. The state should provide the infrastructure for development Pn 
South Africa, ensure the services needed by entrepreneurs. Its South African nature 
is critical. The state is the prbe agent of economic struggle against imperialism, 
guaamteeing not only the profits and labour needs of the entrepreneur but employment 
for all members of the polity (i.e. excluding ~lacks) . In this vision the state is 
very claarly the instrument of the petty bourgeois attack on monopoly control of the 
economy by "imperialist" interests and the means for the transformation of its class 
position. Political power then becomes the sine qua non of the success of the economic 
struggle. The two are indivisible as the transformation of economic consciousness 
aimed at by the Bond is, in effect, a transformation of political consciousness - a 
redefinition of nationalism itself. 
The debates within the AB during the thirties were essentially elitist - 
small groups of h.tellectuals talking to each other in complex 1-. The 
itself displayed little interest. Yet this elitism is central to the process of 
ideological production. Ideologies are forged by class forces seeking wider support. (54) 
The fiercely intellectual debates 1932-8 thus achieved two major objectives. In an 
era of extreme ideological division, they indicated the common ground outlined above, 
facilitating action on these issues. Secondly, with reference to mass action, the 
Kultuurpolitiek of the thirties erected an apparently ti&t yet sufficient flexible 
ideological structure throw which to legitimize mass action. It succeeded in the 
redefinition of the value structure of a broad cultural system. This not.crurly pTaced 
the supporters of the Hertzog definition on the defensive (55) but provided an 
ideological framework for the interpretation and mediation of the urban experience 
of capitalism. Only after these issues had been aired was the Bond able to move I from its intellectual base into the arena of mass mobilization. , 
Yet, even before this was attempted, the Bond's Afrikaner opponents 
reco@ized the W r  this ideological redefinition posed to their position. In a 
famous speech to his Smithfield constituents in November 1935, Prime Minister l 
Hertzog launched a powerful attack on the AB in precisely these terns. Accusing the 
Bond of anti-Ehglish racialism, he asserted (incorrectly) that it and the Gesuiwexde 
Nationalist Par-ty were one and the same body operating at different levels. This 
speech caused much consternation, earning ~ e r t i o ~  the-final iaplacable enmity of the 
AB. (56) 
Prior to 1936, whilst the FAK was working well, the Bondf S cultural 
activities were largely limited, It had not established the matrix of tlalternativell 
cultural organizations which appeared in the late thirties and forties. The means 
of politicizing kultuur, making its appeal immediate to the peat mass of Afrikaaers, 
had not been found. The first faltering mobilization attempts were begun in 1936 
(see below), but it was the cultural orgy of the celebration of the Voortrekker 
Centenary, the Eeufees and Tweede Trek,which politicized the cultural symbols of 
Afrikanerdom, enabling the AB to begin to work with mass support. The Tweede Trek 
appeared to bridge the severe class divisions between Afrikaans-speakers, eliciting 
a massive demand for volkseenheid. (57) Another significant result of the Eeufees 
was the birth of the Initially a purely cultural ormzation, it 
had attracted 3-400,000 mambers by 1941. The Potchefstroom academics flocked to the 
OB, which thrived on the extra-Parliamentary tradition of the north, Its increasingly 
political stanoe finally brought it into fatal conflict with ishe Nationalist Party. 
Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd single-mindedly set out to destroy the organization 
between 1941 and 1944 and re-establish the hegemany of the Party in nationalist 
politics. The intense conflict between them occasioned much conflict within the 
Broederbond after the failure of its reconciliation attempts. (563) 
One final event was mther to politicize! kultuur and enable the AB to 
transform its Nationalist vision into ideological hegemony. Ln September 1939 the 
United Party split on South Africa's participation in what was seen as an 
"imperialist war". General Hertzog and 37 of its MPS left the UP to form the 
Volksparty. The AB hastily convened another gathering at Monument Koppie. Amidst 
great emotion, Hertzog a.nd I'klan appeared together as the spokesmen of an 
apparently reunited volk. In January 1940, they formed the Herenigde (reunited) 
Nationale of ~ o l k s p a F ( ~ ~ ~ / V )  under Hertzog. This uneasy alliance split almost 
immediately on the Principles of the Party. When the Bond forced the issue at the 
Free State Party Congress in November, Hertzog withdrew and resigned from politics. 
His followers in the HNP/V soon split into the Afrikaner Part or the National 
Socialist Nuwe Orde. But Hexeniging meant the ' H i m  to be the sole 
spokesman of a l're-unitedll Afrikanerdom. The petty bourgeoisie was no longer 
politically isolated. The AB could make much of the issue of cultural unity a3ld 
mobilize across class divisions in these terms. 
During the forties, the cultural assaults of the Bond covered every facet 
of organized. social life. Though political disunity soon resurfaced, kultutlrpolitiek 
no longer divided Lfrikau~srs along class or paty political lLnes, The AB 
interpretaticme had been legitimised. Apart from the crucial. isw~~es of tra8e unjlonism 
and the economic struggle, during the war it concentrated on education, pressing for 
home language tuition coupled with an emphasis on its own (largely ~uyperian) Cltris-t.lm 
Xatfonal Education pro e. Largely in response to these oti;acks, Smuts kmned civil 
servants from membership of the Bond in December 1944, occasioning some TOO rasigna%ions, 
A fo'ormer AB chirman claimed that,with the sconomic stm~ggle, the Bond's attacke on %he 
educational eystem were the major apms to the I ~ J T J , ~ ~ S  1948 electora3 victory. ( 5 9 )  
Whila t provided an ideological framework wi-bhin which 50 f o~m 
volkaeenheid, po ws out of class interests and class ac'tion, no% 9ppret%y 
speeches aYzd l=@ cultural gatherings11, as Albert Hertzog recognisecl. (60) Two 
critical h33 movements during the forties gave tlze general cultural movement a specific 
class content, facilitating the politicization of class cleivages in efLL-ti~~dl tbdxm. 
These were the assault on the trade unions and the economic movement. The first 
captured working class support, the second made clear the economic 'basis a ~ d  pe%;icy 
bourgeois content of Afrikaner nationalism. The Bond" ffl. nto Lrade ~ i r ~ k ~ d s a  1 
was the formation in 1934 of a railway workers! union, the by liewng Klopper, 
an AB founder. Spoorbond offered an example both of "non- onalvr trade ~xr~csaf n 
and the mobilization of the savings of its members. r inception, It 
established a savings bank. Thou& later bankrupted, initiates Lne first 
Afrilcaans building society, later to emerge as the now massive Saambou. 
More important than Spoorbond were the poat-1936 orgianlzs,tions19. FollowLq~ %he 1 
1936 Bondersraad and FM congress, the Afrikaaslse Nasionale? Kaltu-d (~atiom.2 l 
Cultml council) was formed to &ve dAmctioua to tke full sgeotm of 01Jlk+,wa:~1 
l 
l 
organizations with the basic a h  of or@ziryy Afrikxmer workers. Tl~.%s ZUVB met with 
some resistance in the Cape and amongst railway workers. But in Oct~ber of that year, 
Drs. A. Hertzog (the Generalfs son), N. Diedrichs, andl P. J. Neyer, together with 
F. de Wet, manager of Volkskas, the bank founded by the AB, formed Die Rasionale Raad 
van Trustees (~ational Council of Trustees - KRT), to provide financial backing for 
Afrikaner trade unions. Its aim was quite explicit - to smash the ideology of class 
amongst Afrikaner workers and bring them into the bosom of the S, The W.T operated 
in fertile grownd. Entrenched by fie gains of the Pact govement, the Labour Pasty 
and. the South African Trades and Labour Council (T & X) still eihibited the artisanal 
exclusivism of craft unions. Ln the crisis of the thirties they strongly opposed 
measures to ease white unenployment which might relax the apprenticeship systea. Ye$ 
both leaned heavily on the support of Afrikaans-speaking workers, &Q, given the pattsxbn 
of proletarianization in South Africa, generally occupied I.ess skilled positions. ?'he 
NRT decided to attack the Labour Party hold over Afrikaner workers through the T & LCv8 
largest single affiliate, the strategic Mine WorkersfUnion. The only non-craft mining 
union, with a predominantly Afrikaans-speaking membership in an industry critical to the 
economy and the racial division of labour, by the mid-thirties the Mine WorkersqUanin 
leadership was thoroq#~ly corrupt and in a cosy i13:ramnt w i t h  the Chanber of Miznes. 
In a long, bitter, twelve-year campaign, the MIT group finally gained control - thee 
its leadership soon appeared no less corrupt than the old. (61) 
The trade union struggle was not without cost within the AB, where as early 
as 1942 discontent with the NRTts progmss was being expressed. (62) In 1942, Neyer 
msigned to start a Labour Wont for the . The following year, the 
HNPfi  formed its own labour organization in response, 
(literally, the Wlaite Workers Protection society), C 
occasioned much conflict within the AB, The broad attack on tmde unionism concentsated 
on the Least skilled workers .i.n the mining, textile, building and steel industries, The 
skilful. manipulation of their very real grievances, together with the extensive cuXtumI 
mobilization tlarou.gh the Bondfa - i.e. changing the ideological context 
of trade unionism - had the desimd effect. Thou& by no means all1 Afrikmer workers 
supported these or~aations, si?Xficien% wem i&ologi@ally weaned fmnz the bureaucratic 
Labotu: Party and 'P & X stmcture to break their power. Following two long strikes 
on the mines in 1946 m d  1947 - against the Mine Workers$ Union - and a huge building 
workers! strike - asinst state training schemes fox African bricklwem - the N"T 
group finally won control of the Mine Workers' Union, and imediately hisaffiliate4 
from the T & LC. The political fruits of this victory were soon plucked. In the 1948 
election, the HNP/V won six mining constituencies for the first time, sufficient to put 
it in power with a majority of five. 
This stru$gle for the soul of white tmdo unionism o c c m d  in a crucial 
phase of South Africa" labour historyI when the relationship between the black 
proletariat and the capitalist state emermd at the political centre. During the 
a powerful, militant African trade union movement developed to question effectively 
entrenched capital/labour relationships. (63) The wartime movement of Africans ink0 
skilled positions also hi&li&ted the relationship between white workers and "che state, 
particularly the less skilled. The AB attack on trade unions was eqlicit& cast ir, l 
terms of a recognition of the dangers of class mobilization in such a climate. Its 
primary aim was to break the power of ideologies of class - to m~bili%e workers in 
tern of their class interests cast in cultural and racial ideologies. In the wards 
of the official NRT history: 
As the so-called guar6.ian of the workers, over s period of 
time the Labour Party developed into a mighty force in 
South African politics.. .. This bond between %he worker 
and the Labour Parby had to be broken, only then would the 
struggle to Dr Hertzog and his small band of activists 
acquire any meaning or significance, This was their major 
message. (64) I 
The activities of the various trade union bodies both occasioned conflict 
between the political organizations of Afrikaner nationalism during the w= and again 
highli&ted the divisions between the petty bourgeoisie of the north m d  south. One 
incident neatly sums this up. Despite strenuous attempts by the Bond and the F-! -to 
raise money for the NRT, it 'became clear that the large sum needed could be obtained 
only from wealthy Cape farmers - it had initially been M e d  by a £10,000 donation 
from the widow of the Stellenbosch farmer who first financed Nasionale Pers and 
Santam, Mrs J d e  Marais. Here the NRT entered reserved %emitory, the preserve of 
the Cape petty bourgeoisie. Though resistant to the Nasionale Kultumad, in 
principle the managers of the political and economic organizations of Cape nationalism 
had little quarrel with the NRTfs aims. But when it began to compete for the same 
sources of finance, open warfare ensued. In 1938, Dr Hertzog approached his matem& 
uncle, a wealthy Stellenbosch farmer, Pieter Neethling, to set up a trust fund for the 
IlRT. Neethling was a founder and director of Santa, and a long and vicious fight 
develtbped between its chairman, W. A. Hofmeyr, and the NRT - won inevitably by Santm, 
which allowed the only specific interest for use. (65) This incident caused 
much ill feeling in the north, which festered as the full impost of southern economic 
power grew more obvious in the economic movement of the forties. 
Of the AB activities, the economic movement had the greatest long-term 
significance. The Bondls concern with economic issues was long paramount. Again, 
Koers first gave coherence to many of its debates. In a seminal article, "The 
-
Economic Reorga.nization of oun: National Lifets, Professor L. J. du Plessis argued that 
Afrikaners had suffered enormously under capitalism, ranging f m m  the conquest of- 
the Republics to the poor white problem. Yet, the cause was not inherent in capitalism 
itaelf. Their struggle should not be directed against capitalism, as socialis-bs agaed, 
but the structure of South African capitalism, more particularly control of finance 
credit-capital itself. Afrikaners should be mobilized to take control of South Africa 
capitalism - develop a system of Frolkskapitalisme (~ational/LPsople@ S capitalism). (66) 
Meyer and Diedrichs, too, mote heavily on economic issues in the thirties. 
Ir? 1934, 1mgely on the initiative of J. J. Bosman, the Bmederbond itself established 
a co-operative bank in Pretoria, with Professor du Plessis as chaiman and most of the 
UR as directors. In 1941, Volkskas was registered as a commercial bank and lost its 
' co-operative form. (67) In the same year the AB also established a retail outlet, 
Uxliewinkels. It, too, later lost its co-operative form. Yet these northern operations 
were limited in scale, unable to generate wider economic activity. 
In the Cape, AB initiatives were not needed. Santa and. Sanlam were thriving. 
S d a l s  actuary syld manager, M. S. LOUW* had long planned an expansion out of 
insurance. As he told the Ekonomiese Volksko~s: 
~ 
To be successful we must utilise the techniques of 
capitalism as they are applied in the ... goldmining 
industry. A f h m c e  company should be started to 
function in industry and commerce like the so-called 
finance houses of Johannesburg. (68) 
LOUW~S vision was to mobilize the savings of Afrikaner farmers and workers in a central 
investment company, moving into industry and commerce. But S d a m  did not possess the 
resources for such mobilization on a national scale. According to his biographer, Louw 
discussed this problem with FAK leaders (ice,. the AB), a d  in 1937 it established a 
commission of enquiry into the economic conditions of Afrikaners. Its report argued 
the Eeufees would create the necessary climate for an Ekonomiese Volkskonases 
(peoplel S economic congress) in 1939, with the prime function of approving Louwr S l 
scheme. (69) A Committee of prominent Cape Broers, Louw, Dr T. E. DBnges (AB vice- l 
chairman during the war) and Dr C. G. W. Schumann, was appointed to draft proposals 
for the investment company. On their advice, Sanlam agreed to underwrite the share- 
issue. Again, this early southern dominance is interesting. Though long concerned with ~ 
economic issues, the northern petty bourgeoisie could not summon the expertise to 
initiate such a major undertaking - and was forced to rely on S d a m  for capital, 
planning and staff. 
The Eeufees did generate popular enthusiasm for an economic movement. In a 
powerful speech before the waggons in Blomufontein, Dr J. D. (vader) Kestell proposed 
the establishment of a massive, central, reddinREldaad fund to rescue the from 
poverty. His theme, In volk red homself (a nation rescues itself), became the motto of 
the economic movement, thou&$ the £l5O,OOO eventually collected in the 
fell short of Dr Kestellt* multi-million pound vision. The first Ekonomiese V o l k s k o ~ s  
was convened 3x1 October 1939 after the Bond had ratified its proposals. At least 
ei&teen of the twenty-two-man K o ~ e s  committee were Broers. The strategy enunciated 
was threefold: to co-ordinate and tap Afrikaner resources in savings and. consumption; 
thereby to foster finance capital, filtering control of the meam of production 
downwards; and, thr o w  control of the state, to extend the network of infrastructural 
public corporations. Clearly class mobilization threatened the whole basis of this 
strategy. Thus the cultural and political struggle were seen as critical elements of 
the economic struggle, and the organizational network which developed lent itself to 
both. (70) 
Three broad organizations grew out of the Kowres. Federale Volksbeleaainffs 
(FVB) was established as the official investment company. The sale of FVB shares 
occa~lioned much conflict with other entrepreneurs trying to raise capital fron the 
volk, jealous of its official status. Smlam had ultimately to take up a large 
-
percentage of the shares it had underwritten, giving: it effective control of the 
company. An Ekonomiese Instituut of the FAK was also formed to co-ordinate policy for 
the economic movement. The Enstituut was the AB economic policy-making body, 
establishing, thirdly, the (RZ~B) under Dr Diedrichs, designed to 
mobilize mass support thro f economic and cultural activities, and 
"re-educatev the Bfrikaner economically. By 1946 the RDB had 64,771 members in 381 
branches, though it!: aaembership fell off rapidly after the war. (71) Within the Bond, 
pressure &.eveloped for an organization specifically for Afrikaner businessmen. After 
an "investigationr9 by the Ekonomiese Instituut (i.e. AB), the Afrikaxnse Handelsinstituut 
was formed by the RDB in 1942. The growth of this purely bourgeoisie organiza%ion was 
to alter the role of the Ekonomiese Instituut, which lost its broad policy-making 
function to the H~delsinstituut. After l942 policy was formulated by this specifically 
capitalist grouping rather than just within the AB itself. Thou& also dominated by 
glany A23 members, the N~elsinstituut was never a simple Bond front like the FAK. As 
a specifically class organization, it fostered the interests of that class rather than 
the S. Heavily influenced by the power of southern gmups, the Handelsinstituut 
developed a real autonomy, independent of the wider concerns of the Bond. This at 
times brought its capitalists into open conflic-l; with the AB and the EKP/V, 
particulw1;y on labour issues. 
During the forties, the policy of the AB co-ordinated economic movement was 
to assist the formation of as many Afrikaner enterprises in as may fieldaJ as possible. 
In numerical terms, this was higkly successflrl. The number of Afrikasleri-owned 
mufacking establishments rose from 1,293 to 3,385, 1939-49, with a, turnover increase 
froa &6m to £4'3.6m. The number of commercial undertakings rose from 2,428 to 9,585, 
turnover increasing from £28m to t2203.7m. Financial undertakings, too, increased from 
40 to 68, the value of administered funds rising from £27m to e74.m. Yet many of 
these were small and under-capitalized, floundering in the fifties. Afrikaxzer trading 
concerns particularly were hard hit by the falling rate of profit in retailing. (72) 
The problem of small undertakings was recognized by both the Handelsinstituut and the AS. 
At a second in October 1950, it was claimed that the 
chieved. A subtle shift in emphasis occurred. No 
longer was the stress on the frenetic establishment of new undertakings, but on 
consolidating existing ones, particularly financial institutions whose capital could 
ensure healthy growth. The second Kowres marked =L important shift in the ideolom of 
Afrikaner capital - a movement away from the pet* bourgeois competitive ethic towards 
an acceptance of monopoly and its underlying class relations. It marked the opening 
of a real division between a new bourgeoisie a316 the petty bousgeoisie, which gathered 
force in the nationalist politics of the fifties and sixties. And, because it was 
again in the Cape that the majority of the more successful undertakiqp established 
themselves, these class divisions continued to take the form of regionalism. (75) 
Thus, the threefold attack of AB activity - iedological redefinition, the 
trade union assault and the economic movement - developed its own c during the 
war, partly taking it out of the Bond's control. The war itself marked a shift in 
South African politics. Rapid c-S in the structure of production brought the 
contradictions of South African capitalism bubbling to the political surface. 
Lntensified political struggle centred on a confrontation between capital and the state, 
faced by an increasingly organized and militant black proletariat. Such a profound 
division clearly brou&t into political question the entire ideological and political 
structure of a system of exploitation based on the racial division of labour. The 1948 
election was few-t on this issue. These developments touched, the position of all 
classes in the social structure, clearly affecting the material interests of the groups 
the Bond was trying to mobilize. Farmers were pressurized by acute labour problems, 
white workers threatened by black proletarian militancy. The operations of the 
Broederbond profoundly altered the iaeological framework and class nature of Afrikaner 
nationalism. In a fundamental sense they shaped a class alliance offering apparent 
solutions to the politifal crisis of South African capitalism, and a distinct alternative 
to the rnonopoXy interests represented in the United Party. Each of the three meas of 
operation outlined above were fundamental to the shaping of this alliance and critical 
to the slim eleotoral victory of 1948. 
Thou& the AB was the shizdow behind this new Afrikaner nationalism, it 
cannot really bta said the Bond "did" anything at all. It did not act organizationally, 
but rather decided what should be done - formulated policy which other mayldated 
orgaszizations or individuals implemented. Though it was the guiding force which brought 
Afrikaner nationalism to power, its internal and external relations were storroly, 
reflecting the class divisions within nationalism. It is importmt,too, not to 
underestimate the independent role of the Party. The HNP/V was no mere Broederbond 
front, but the central organization of the Afrikaner nationalism the Bond tried to 
CO-orhinate. In it were represented all the class forces of that nationalism, 
whilst the A 3  only ever represented bourgeois and petty bourgeois groups. . 
Ironically, the pasty was to end up dominating the Bond. Under Malan and Strijdom, 
an Important, formal independence was maintained between the two orgaszizatiow. But, 
for a variety of reasons to do with the class conflict within the party, Verwoerd 
began a process which undemined the Bond's independence, allowing Vorster to convert 
it into a "support orga+nU of the party itself - a party now dominated by the 
capitalists over most of whose birth the Broederbond had so anxiously hovered. (74) 
(2) Report of the Commission of Ez&auixv into Secret Organisations (RP 20/1965), 
paas 36-7 (hereafter the Both commission). The Co~ssion received the "full 
co-operationu of the Bond. The then AB Chairman recommended its report as "the 
truth" and. "full story1f on the Bond. Interview 10.6.75. 
(3) AB Constitution, clause 4c, quoted in Die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk en die 
Afrikaner Broederbond, submitted to the General Synod 23/4/64, Chapter 111, 
Section 15 (heredtsr the Oelofse ~eport). This, too, quotes from m a n y  
voluntaxily given official AB documents. Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations in this paper are mine. 
(4) The work of many Afrikaner historians falls into this category. One prominent 
author has emressed his belief in Divine appointment for this task. See 
i~oorwoord" G. D. Schulte, Die Ontwikkeli$ van die Politieke Denke van die 
Afrikmer. Deel I, 1652-1806 (Johannesburg, 1967). 
(5) Again, much "Ehglish" writing on Afrikaner nationalism seems little more than 
disguised Boe-bashing, based on conspiracy theories: e.g. W. H. Vatcher, Jr., 
White Laamr  ondo don, 1965). 
(6) Some honomble exceptions are M. Roberts and A. E. G. Trollip, The South African 
Opposition 1939-1945 (cape Town, 1945), and T. Dunbar Moodie, The Rise of 
Afrikanerdom (~erkeley , 1975). 
(7) P. Van den Berghe, South Africa: a Study in Conflict (~niv. Calif. Press, 1967), 
p. 267. Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Haxmondsworth, 1967), 
does introduce the concept of class, but simply imposes it on racial/cultural 
categories without an explication of the relationship, producing a conspiracy view 
of Afrikaner nationalism. Moodie, op. cit., partly explores the relationship 
throw an examination of the mneration of ideology within the cultural context 
of the Ifcivil religion" of "Afrikanerdoml'. Yet the expla-mtion remains at the 
level of ideas. The acquisition and transmission of "civil religionw and the 
reception of ideology by mass groups after formulation by an elite remain 
unexplored beyond assuming that action in cultu;ca;l terms is self-evident. 
(8) One recent paper has gone so far as to argue historians must accept the 
cate@rb.ss asrd concepts handed on by sociologists and economists, themselves 
playing no role in tne formulation of their analytical tools: N. Garson, 
qfRace Relations and Class Conflict as Factors in South African History in the 
Twentieth CenhqyIt, University of the Witwatersrand, September 1974. Moodie, 
op. cit . ,and Irving Hexham (lthtch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner 
Nationalismtt, Collected Seminar Papers, Vol. I, Centre for Southern African 
Studies, York University, 1975, pp. 8-25) explore the development of Afrikaner 
nationalist ideology, but both have been heavily concerned with the theological 
inputs of Calvinism and tend to take ideology at its face value. 
(9) But cf T, Dunbar Moodie, "The Rise of Afrikaner Nationa,lism as an bmnent 
Critique of Marxts Theory of Social Classv, African Studies Institute, 
University of the Witwatersrand, 27 October 1975. 
(10) In q y  use of terms such as "Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie" or "Afrikaner capital", 
it is not their ethnic character which is determinant. They are defineqvfirst, 
not by the fact of being tlAfrikanerlt but by their specific relationship to the 
means of production. The "Afrikaner" ch-cter ?my, in distinct historical 
epochs, separate our specific class fractions at the political level, precisely 
because of the nature of the intervention of the political instance in South 
African history. Ply use of class analysis in no way suggests that "Afrikaners" 
constituted a separate class, but that for specific historical reasons, Afrikaans- 
speaking fractions of various classes came to have their interests articulated 
under one apparently sup-class, nationalist rubric. 
(11) For the description of the Bondts formation, see Rapport 24.9.72; Oelofse 
Report, pp. 7-8. 
(12) See the Biography of their first chairman by N. J. le Row, W. A. Hofmeyr: Sy 
Werk an W w d e  (Cape Town, 1953), 125; E. P. du Plessis, cn VoZk Staan Op (cape 
Town, 1964), 57; and the Cape Party's official history., Die Nasionale Par*: 
35-45 
(13) a, November 1968. 
(14) See T. R. H. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond (Cape Town, 1966). 
(15) S. Pauw, Die Eeroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner in die Stad (~tellenbosch, 1946), 
217-242. 
(16) Le Roux, op. cit., 91. See also Van Rooyen, loc. cit. 
(17) Botha Commission, para 32. 
(18) L. J. du Plessis, The Star, 12.10.48. This is not the Pmfessor L. J. du Plessis, 
a leading Bsoer for 30 years. Ironically, the first person to address the Bond 
was J. H. Hofmeyr. Unfortunately the subject of the address is not known. 
Interview with founder member, L. E. B. Van Niekerk, Rand Daily Mail, 24.1.64. 
(19) Oelofse Report, 7. 
(20) Undated Military Intelligence Report (from internal evidence, 1944), "Die 
Afrikaner Broederbond", Section V, para 4, i & ii: Witwatersrand University 
Arohives, A.l, Hofmeyr Papers, file Ce (hereafter the Hoflneyr papers). 
(21) 'Who evemm South Africa: the People vs. the Broederbond", Hofmeyr Papers. 
(22) Oelofse, op. cit., 8; du Plessis, OR. cit. ; "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", 
Section V, i & ii, Hofmeyr Papers. 
(23) Discussion of the "four purges" in AB histow, Sunday Times, 5.11.72; "Die 
Afrikaner Broederbond" , Section V, paras 6, 7 & 8, Hofmeyr Papew. 
(24) Oelofse Report, Chapter 111, Section 17, paras 11-56, on organizational stmcture. 
On selection procedure, ibid., Section 16, paras 2-9. On Vwmstelde Broers, 
Section 17, para 36e. The quoted f o m r  member, who wishes to remain anonymous, 
was interviewed in June 1975. 
(25) Intemiew, June 1975. Thls former 20-year member had. been ohaiman of his division. 
Militaxy intelligence Report, 29.3,1944r Section V, Hofheyr Papers; A33 
Secretary, 1. N. Lombasd, Die Transvaler, 14.12.44, 20.12.44, 30.12.44 & 3.1.45; 
on the 1972 breakdown, , 20.1.73, quoting allegedly official 
documentss whose veracity was unchallenged. By 1972, Broem in most of these 
occupational gmups were in very influential poaitions, not necessarily 
conveyed by the azbitsary categories. For example, the 1,691 "educationalists1' 
broke down into 24 Universi* and College Rectors, 171 professors, 176 
lecturers, 468 headmasters and 121 school inapectors. The 210 politicians 
co~lzprised the State President, the Prime Minister, 19 Cabinet and Deputy 
Ministers, 79 MPS, 28 Senators, 69 MPCs, and 13 Party organizers. The editor 
of the rga,n, Die Afrikaner, claimed the influx of 
busine dfl the AB. Interview with B. M. Schoeman, 
30.6.75. On the shift in occupational dominance and the increasing bourgeois 
control of the Bond, see B. M. Schoeman, Vorster se LOO0 Dae (~retoria, 1974), 
and V T  loc. cit. This view is corroborated in J. P. H. Serfontein, Die 
(~retoria, 1970). The former AB chairman, Dr P. J. Meyer, 
a p e d  that the Bond had "moved with the timestr and was now largely controlled 
by businessmen. Interview, 10.6.75. 
Clauses 2-4, AB constitution, Oelofse Report, Chapter 111, Section 15; 
AB Secretary in Die Transvaler, 3.1.45. 
Professor L, J. Du Plessis, Koers, Vol. 11, No. 1. August 1934. 
Quoted Botha Commission, para 39. 
Interview, June 1975. 
!'Die Afrikaner Broederbondtl, Section V, para 15, Hofmeyr Papers. 
Undated Military Intelligence Chart (~robabl~ 1943), Hofmeyr papers. 
Sunday Times, 28.1.73. These committees include: Non-white affairs; planning; 
youth; the press; economic affairs; wiculture; Africa; religion; 
international affaim; relations with the English; sport; and technical and 
natural sciences. 
Botha Commission, para 62; AB OnoElendbrief, 4/43/44, para 9, Hofmeyr Papers; 
, 26.5.63; Moodie, op. cit., p. 102. 
The Sunday Times in fact inspired the formation of an anti-AB Nasionalistebond 
based on this resentment. See, for example, 15.12.63. 
Military Intelligence Report, dated 29.3.44, Section VI, Hofmeyr Papers. 
G. D. Scholtz, Dr Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe (~ohazmesbur~, 1944). 
"Die Afrikaner Broederbondtt , Section V, para 8. 
Article by AB Secretary ackaowledging paCernity of YAK, Die Transvaler, 30.3.44, 
ELnd AB and F M  chairman, Professor H, B. Thorn im, Refemte van die Jubileum 
Komres van dei FAK (~ohanneeburg, 1959), g. Moodie, op. cit . , draws a useful 
distinction between the Bond's kultuwolitiek and the p-olitiek of the 
period. 
AB Chairxnan to 1932 Bondsraad, quoted by General Hertzog, Rand DaiLv Mail, 
8.11.35. 
Irving Hexham, op. cit . , in fact argues that the &refonneerde influence was 
paramount in the foxandation of Afrikaner nationalism. This, I think, overstates 
the case and certainly overemphasizes the ttideologicallt. The University of 
Potchefstroon for Christian Hieer Education is officially Gerefomeerde, the 
Gerefoslneerd.8 Kerk being the most rigidly conservative of the three major 
Afrikaner Calvinist churches. The others are the large Nederduitsch 
Gerefomeerde Kerk (hereafter NGK) and the Nederduitsch Hemomde Kerk. 
See letter from the Secretary of the 'lRoya1 Order of Scotlandf1 to J. H. Hofneyr, 
dated 17.8.48, and "Die Afrikaner Broederbondl', Section V, parae 9 & 10, both in 
the Hofmeyr Papers. 
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Fox a description of this incident, ibid., 109-114. 
Vol 11, No 1, August 1934. 
This had apparently always been envisaged, "thou@ not announced at the timef'. 
The co-operative fom was initially adopted "to gain the co-operation of the 
Afrikmer masses", and the bomd was very sensitive to the charge of having 
misled the public, Volkshandel, VIII, 4, June 1947. For the Bond1 S 
achowle~ent of paternity, see Die Transvaler, 30.12.44. 
Quoted E. P. du Plessis, op. cit., 114. 
See W. J. Bezuidenhout, Dr Tinie Louw: In Kvkie in die Ekonomiese Geskiedenis 
van die Afrikaner (~ohannesburg, 1968), 63-4. 
See E. P. du Plessis, OR. cit., Chapter VII. 
Inspan, V, 4, January 1946. 
Handelsinstituut survey, Volkshandel, XI, 7, September 1950. On the effect of 
declining retail profit rates, see L. J. Potgietex,ffDie Ekonomie van die 
Afrikaner en sy Aandeel in die Sakelewett, unpublished M.Cm., Potchefstroom 
University, 1954, 26-44. 
See Kowg!es issues of Volkshazldel, Vol XI, Nos 7 & 8, September and October 
1950, and Inspan, Vol I, Nos I1 & 12, August and September 1950, and Vol X, 
No 1, October 1950. 
See B. M. Schoernan, op. cit., and J. P. H. Serfontein, b. cit. 
